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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Utah Farm Bureau does not contest the issues as stated by the Plaintiffs. 
However, Utah Farm Bureau does challenge the Horrells' assertion that this Court 
can determine that any error was harmless by applying a de novo standard. The 
trial court, by ordering a new trial, has already determined that the error was 
prejudicial. This Court has recently held that it does "not reverse a trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial absent an abuse of discretion." 
Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). This standard 
should apply to the trial court's determination that its error regarding the burden 
of proof was harmful. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
There are no controlling constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or 
rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Utah Farm Bureau is not dissatisfied with the Horrells' statement regarding 
the nature of the case. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Utah Farm Bureau is not dissatisfied with the Horrells' statement regarding 
the course of proceedings. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Before setting forth a more complete Statement of Facts, Utah Farm Bureau 
wishes to correct an error in the Horrells' Statement of Facts. The Horrells state 
in paragraph 3 of their Statement of Facts that Utah Farm Bureau's adjuster 
"hoped that the Horrells would 'go away' during this period time." Brief of 
Appellant, p. 5. 
Utah Farm Bureau has examined the citations to this particular contention. 
(R. 2323, 2024.) The record at page 2323 sets forth the testimony of Arlene 
Beckstrom, the mortgagee on the property, who was totally unrelated to Utah 
Farm Bureau or the adjustment of the claim. The testimony at R. 2024 does not 
contain any reference to "hope" or anything resembling the Horrells' assertion. 
Perhaps the Horrells are referring to R. 2026, a portion of which states: 
Q. You hoped he'd go away, didn't you? 
A. Well, to be honest, there's a lot of people that do-when we ask 
for a proof of loss that don't follow through with their claim 
and do go away. 
R. 2026. Mr. Bachmann's testimony related to the fact that the Horrells failed to 
submit a completed Proof of Loss after being advised to do so by Utah Farm 
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Bureau. As set forth more fully below, Mr. Bachmann intended to convey the fact 
that many people do not continue with claims when required to state under oath 
that they did not start the fire. It is extremely unfair for the Horrells to assert that 
Mr. Meade's question was Mr. Bachmann's answer. At no time did Mr. 
Bachmann state that he hoped the Horrells would go away. 
In order to provide this Court with a more comprehensive statement of 
facts, Utah Farm Bureau sets forth the following. To prove an incendiarism 
defense, most states have required evidence of 1) incendiary nature; 2) opportu-
nity; and 3) motive. Emasco Ins. Co. v. Way mire, 788 P.2d 1357, 1360 (Mont. 
1990). Utah Farm Bureau has conformed its Statement of Facts to these elements. 
INCENDIARY NATURE OF THE FIRE 
1. On October 3, 1990, at 11:29 p.m., the South Salt Lake Fire Depart-
ment was called to a fire at the Horrells' residence. R. 2863. 
2. Captain Michael Larsen was one of the fire-fighters called to battle the 
fire. He testified that the fire was consistent with an accelerated fire while he was 
attempting to extinguish it: 
Q. Well, when you went in to fight that fire, based on your obser-
vations, how was the fire responding to your water and what 
did that mean to you? 
A. Well, I had some very bad reactions with the water. Every time 
we moved it to the right, we'd get a flareup of the fire and it 
would roll over our heads. 
Q. What did that mean to you? 
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A. That meant that I had a flammable liquid, an accelerant in that 
fire. 
R. 2870. Captain Larsen also observed ?,V-patterns,,f which is indicative that a 
chemical or accelerant is burning. R. 2888. 
3. Captain Larsen further testified that his observations convinced him 
that the fire had started in two separate locations, not one, when the fire 
department arrived. R. 2876.l 
4. After the fire was extinguished, the South Salt Lake Fire Department 
returned possession of the home to Mr. Horrell at approximately 2:48 a.m. R. 
2138. 
5. At approximately 4:35 a.m., the South Salt Lake City Fire Department 
was called back to the Horrell property for a second fire. R. 2138. 
6. Shawn Irvine, one of the firefighters attempting to extinguish the 
second fire, testified that it would be difficult to reignite a building after 30,000 
gallons of water were used to extinguish the first fire. R. 2146. 
7. Mr. Irvine also testified that when he arrived for the second fire the 
roof was burning, which surprised him: 
1
 Under such circumstances, the probability that the fire was accidental is 
extremely remote because it would require an accident in each location at the 
same precise moment. 
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A. I noticed heavy flames issuing from the rooftop. And I was 
looking over the hobby shop to see that the roof on the house 
was burning. 
Q. Did that surprise you in light of the 30,000 gallons of water? 
A. Very surprised. 
R. 2158. 
8. Captain Larsen characterized the second fire as "accelerated": 
Q. And how did the second fire you fought compare with the first 
fire? 
A. The second fire, to me, was more surface fire, more of a rapid 
burn, rapid build up, accelerated. 
R. 2893. 
9. Randy Jacobson is a firefighter and fire investigator for South Salt 
Lake City. R. 2647. Mr. Jacobson was assigned to perform a cause and origin 
investigation into the fire at the Horrell premises. 2653. 
10. Mr. Jacobson testified that there are only two causes for a fire: 
accidental and incendiary. R. 2655. 
11. Mr. Jacobson examined the electrical system and found no evidence 
of a short or other accidental cause of the fire. R. 2656. 
12. Based upon his investigation into the fire, Mr. Jacobson rendered an 
opinion that the fire was incendiary and that Greg Horrell started the fire. R. 
2725-2729. The basis for this opinion included not only Mr. Jacobson's conclusion 
that there was no accidental cause of the fire, but also that an examination of Mr. 
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Horrell's story and his many financial problems pointed to him as starting the fire. 
Id. 
13. Shortly after the fire, Robert "Jake" Jacobsen (not related to Randy 
Jacobson) was retained to investigate the fire on behalf of Utah Farm Bureau. Mr. 
Jacobsen was also able to eliminate any "electrical or accidental causes" and 
concluded that Mr. Horrell set the fire: 
Q. Now, when you say "the insured cannot be eliminated," did 
you eliminate electrical and other accidental causes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever eliminate the insured as the one who set the fire? 
A. No. 
* * * 
Q. I take it you have an opinion on whether or not the insured set 
the fire? 
A. I do. 
Q. And can you tell—could you tell us what that opinion is? 
A. My opinion is that Mr. Horrell set this fire. 
R. 3150-51. 
14. Mr. Jacobsen also rendered the opinion that the first fire originated 
in two separate, unconnected, locations. R. 3110. 
15. One basis for Mr. Jacobsen's opinion that Mr. Horrell set the fire was 
that an accelerant was used: 
Taking into consideration that the fire department took about a four-
minute response, this fire was going. It was involved and fully 
involved upon their arrival. For those conditions to occur, this fire 
was accelerated. It had to have had something other than an accidental 
cause for it to ignite to get to those conditions. 
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R. 3152. Mr. Jacobsen further testified: 
Q. And to have an advanced fire like that, do you have an opinion 
as to whether or not an accelerant has to be involved in order 
to create that? 
A. An accelerant of some type has to be involved. There's no 
doubt about it. I can walk over and light that chair up, and we 
can all sit here for five or ten minutes and watch it burn. I 
mean, it is not just going to burn that violently. Eventually it 
is going to get going as with anything in this room. But to have 
it advance to the conditions that they found as testified by Mr. 
D'Emal and the first arriving officers and the fire crews it had 
to have some help. 
R. 3158-59. 
16. Another basis for Mr. Jacobsen's opinion was that the home was 
locked when the fire department arrived. R. 3162. Mr. Horrell's theory was that 
an unidentified "shooter" started the fire. (See "Opportunity" Section, infra). Mr. 
Jacobsen opined that the securing of the home served another purpose: 
It's my opinion that when this fire was set, Mr. Horrell didn't want 
anyone to put it out. There's two things that come into play when 
considering that: One, that the house was locked up. That would keep 
anyone from going in and getting hurt or going in and putting out the 
fire. The other thing that comes into play is that shooting incident. 
The shooting incident was nothing more than a red herring, and—to 
try and make sure that his buddy, Mr. D'Emal wasn't going to be a 
hero and go in and try to put the fire out in Greg's house. 
R. 3162.2 
2
 The firefighters found no evidence of forced entry. R. 3163. As a 
result, Mr. Horrell's theory presumes that the "shooter" started the fire and 
then took due care to lock the home with the key prior to departing. R. 3163. 
Another firefighter testified that one door was unlocked when he arrived. But 
C:\WP51\HORRELL\101227.BR 7 
17. Mr. Jacobsen's opinion was also based upon the financial problems 
experienced by Mr. Horrell. R. 3178-79. 
18. On February 4, 1991, Mr. Jacobsen set forth his opinions in a report 
to Utah Farm Bureau, stating his views that the fire was of suspicious origin and 
that Mr. Horrell's statements were so inconsistent as to raise a concern of 
deception. R. 3165-3167. (See Report, attached as Exhibit "A"). 
19. In early November, 1990, Jake Jacobsen provided evidence samples 
to Dr. Robert Lantz, an analytical chemist. R. 3062. Included were carpet 
samples from the utility room and another area of the home, as well as some glass, 
and a control sample of carpet from the home. R. 3062-63. 
20. Based upon his chromatograph studies, Dr. Lantz determined that the 
chemicals found on the samples matched mineral spirits, kerosene, or paint 
thinner, all highly flammable compounds. R. 3080-3082. (See Report of Dr. 
Lantz, attached as Exhibit "B"). 
21. Mr. Robert Adamson, one of Mr. Horrell's "gamer" friends, testified 
that Mr. Horrell kept solvents and other flammable compounds in his store: 
MR. MORGAN: And did he have any flammable in the store? 
A. Yes, a spray primer had some flammable solvents; any of the 
enamel-based paints had flammable solvents. That's probably 
the extent of most of them. 
this is of little use to Mr. Horrell, who told Mr. Jacobsen that the home was 
locked. 
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R. 2970. 
OPPORTUNITY 
22. On the night of the fire, Mr. Horrell was playing a hobby game called 
"Fantasy Hero" at his hobby store which neighbored his home. R. 2336. 
23. One of the game's participants, Jacques D'Emal, testified that Mr. 
Horrell appeared "a little agitated." R. 2351. 
24. Another of the participants, Robert Adamson, testified that Mr. 
Horrell was more "fidgety" than normal. R. 2958. He further testified that Mr. 
Horrell was less focused: 
A. Okay. Well, normally Greg was very involved, very fixed or 
focused on the game that he was playing. But that night he did 
get up on several occasions and moved things about in the 
store, go back to the house, do various things. And he also had 
an intercom set up that went back into the house. And he did 
that sometimes when he had his—when he had his kids at home. 
He was making sure they were asleep. 
R. 2955. 
25. During the course of the evening, Mr. Horrell left several times. (See 
Exhibit 222, which summarizes Mr. Horrell's actions on the night of the fire, 
attached as Exhibit "C"). 
26. Mr. Dave Wiggins, one of the participants at this game, left at 
approximately 11:00 p.m., and only Mr. Horrell and Mr. D'Emal remained. R. 
2972. 
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25. Mr. D'Emal testified that at about 11:00 p.m. on the night of the fire, 
he was loading his game materials into his vehicle when he heard a noise: 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And after you heard this noise, when did you next see Greg? 
I heard the noise, closed my car door, turned and Greg came 
running out of the store. 
And did he say anything to you? 
He yelled at me to run because someone was shooting at him. 
* * * 
Where did you go? 
Diagonally, across Main Street to a small lot, vacant lot, very 
small, that's behind a used car lot or used to be a used car lot. 
I'm not sure what it is now. 
And were you able to see the property from where you were 
standing? 
The store front, yes. 
Could you se the house? 
You can't see the house from the street. 
Did you observe flames at some point in time? 
After Vd been standing therefor a few minutes, I noticed there 
was a glow and some embers flying up from over the top of the 
building next door to Greg (Indicating). 
R. 2342-43 (emphasis added). 
MOTIVE 
27. The home involved in the fire was sold to the Horrells by Arlene 
Beckstrom in 1983. R. 2287. 
28. On March 27, 1990, a foreclosure report was issued. R. 2050. 
29. On April 20, 1990, a Notice of Default was issued. Id. 
30. A Notice of Trustee Sale was issued on October 2, 1990, one day 
prior to the fire. R. 2051, 2303-04. (See Exhibit 96, attached as Exhibit f,DM). 
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31. Between 1983 and 1990, the Horrells gave Ms. Beckstrom many 
checks in payment on the note which wouldn't clear the bank. R. 2288. 
32. The Utah Farm Bureau policy of insurance was applied for by Mr. 
Horrell on July 27, 1990. R. 2051. 
33. Due to an unfavorable credit report, Utah Farm Bureau sent a Notice 
of Cancellation on August 31, 1990. Id. (See Notice of Cancellation, attached as 
Exhibit "E"). 
34. The policy of insurance was to be cancelled effective October 4, 1990, 
at 12:01 a.m., approximately 30 minutes after the fire started. Id. 
35. In the two years prior to this fire, Utah Power & Light sent 16 "final 
notices" to the Horrells indicating that if payment was not made, the power would 
be terminated. R. 2943. Utah Power made 12 personal visits to the Horrells in an 
attempt to collect overdue payments. Id. In the four months prior to the fire (June 
25, 1990, through October, 1990), the Horrells made no payments on their power 
bill. R. 2944.3 
3
 These facts give the Court some flavor of the financial incentives Mr. 
Horrell had to light the fire on October 4, 1990. There is a wealth of addition-
al information which also shows the Horrells' dire financial straits, but to detail 
each item would exhaust the page limitation of this brief. 
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OTHER SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES 
36. Shortly before the fire, the Horrells decided to take a three day trip 
to Vernal, Utah. R. 1616. 
37. For this reason, they packed up all their clothes and their children's 
clothes and left town on October 2, 1990. R. 1614. 
38. However, when the family reached Park City, they decided to return, 
ostensibly because Mrs. Horrell needed to meet a Mountain Fuel employee the 
next day at her mother's home to light the pilot light on her furnace. R. 1615. 
39. The Horrells got a room in Park City, 45 minutes from home, and 
returned to Salt Lake City the following day (October 3). During the early 
evening, Mrs. Horrell decided to stay at her mother's home with her children, 
allegedly due to power problems at their home. R. 1948. 
40. As a result, all of the family (except Greg Horrell)4, their clothes, and 
essential necessities were out of the home at the time of the fire. 
DECISION TO DENY CLAIM 
41. A few days after the fire, Larry Bachmann, an adjuster for Utah Farm 
Bureau, instructed another employee to retain an independent adjuster, David 
Rawlings, and a cause and origin expert, Robert "Jake" Jacobsen. R. 2047. 
4
 As stated earlier, Greg Horrell played fantasy games at his hobby shop 
that evening. 
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42. Mr. Bachmann instructed Mr. Rawlings to do a "scope of loss" to 
determine if the home was a total loss and to obtain an appraisal to determine its 
value. R. 2048. 
43. On October 25, 1990, Mr. Rawlings reported that Mr. Horrell had 
discussed the home with the building inspector and was advised that he would not 
be allowed to repair the home. R. 2049. 
44. Prior to the denial, Mr. Bachmann had in his possession the Foreclo-
sure Report, the Notice of Default, and the Notice of Trustee Sale. R. 2050-51. 
45. Mr. Bachmann also had the information relating to the Utah Farm 
Bureau policy and the fact that it was due to expire 30 minutes after the fire was 
started. R. 2051. 
46. Mr. Bachmann received the statements of Mr. D'Emal, Mr. Adamson, 
and Mr. Wiggins which indicated that the Notice of Trustee Sale was posted at the 
residence prior to the fire. R. 2052. 
47. On November 2, 1990, Mr. Bachmann sent Mr. Horrell a letter 
indicating that a Sworn Statement and Proof of Loss were due within 60 days and 
that the claim was still under investigation, and that the investigation could not be 
completed until the Proof of Loss was submitted. R. 2053. 
48. Prior to denying the claim, Mr. Bachmann was aware that Mr. Horrell 
had filed bankruptcy on November 15, 1990. R. 2055. Mr. Bachmann reviewed 
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the bankruptcy schedules and was concerned because there were inconsistencies 
between the statements given by Mr. Horrell and those schedules. R. 2055-2062. 
49. The Proof of Loss that was submitted did not contain information on 
the amount of losses Mr. Horrell was claiming. R. 2063. Upon receipt of that 
Proof of Loss on January 21, 1991, Mr. Bachmann wrote to Mr. Horrell and 
indicated that the Proof of Loss was inadequate, that it needed to be completed 
before the claim could be considered, and to contact Mr. Bachmann if he had any 
questions concerning the Proof of Loss. R. 2065-66. 
50. On February 4, 1991, Mr. Bachmann received Mr. Jake Jacobsen's 
cause and origin report indicating that he was unable to identify any accidental 
cause for the fire, and that the fire was intentionally set and the insured was 
probably responsible for it. R. 2068-69. (See Report of Robert Jacobsen, 
attached as Exhibit "A"). 
51. Mr. Jacobsen included in his report statements from the other 
participants in the fantasy game and his conversations with the fire department. R. 
2069. 
52. Despite Mr. Bachmann's letter regarding the inadequacy of the Proof 
of Loss, Mr. Horrell did not submit a Proof of Loss until October 18, 1991. R. 
2074. 
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53. On December 28, 1991, an examination under oath was taken from 
Mr. Horrell. R. 2070. This is "always" done after the completed Proof of Loss is 
submitted so that the company knows what is claimed. R. 2070-71. (The delay 
between receipt of the Proof of Loss and the Examination under Oath was 
apparently due to scheduling conflicts between the counsel involved. R. 2076). 
54. On March 18, 1992, Mr. Bachmann denied the claim. R. 2077. The 
primary basis for his denial was that the fire was of incendiary origin and that Mr. 
Horrell set the fire. R. 2077-2078. Mr. Jacobsen's report outlined that there were 
two distinct locations of fire during the initial fire. R. 2078. Mr. Jacobsen also 
included the report from Dr. Lantz stating that an accelerant such as mineral 
spirits, paint thinner, and kerosene, was used to start the fire. R. 2079-80. Mr. 
Bachmann was also aware that Mr. Jacobsen was not able to rule out any 
accidental cause of the fire and was not able to rule out the insured as the person 
who set the fire. R. 2079. (See Denial Letter, Exhibit 463, attached as Exhibit 
"F"). 
55. Mr. Bachmann also took into account the numerous inconsistencies 
between Mr. Horrell's statements to the fire department, Mr. Jacobsen, and the 
bankruptcy court regarding various matters. R. 2082. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court correctly concluded that Utah Farm Bureau should not 
have been required to prove its contractual defenses by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The overwhelming majority of courts have held that the proper standard of 
proof for an incendiarism or misrepresentation defense is a preponderance of the 
evidence. Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 693, 695-96, n.2 (Conn. 
1988). 
These courts properly recognize that the incendiarism and misrepresentation 
defenses are contract defenses under the policy and should be treated similar to 
other contractual issues. Italian Fisherman, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 
521 A.2d 912, 913 (N.J. Ct. App. 1987); Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21 
Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1968). Because Utah Farm Bureau was doing 
no more than proving another provision of the same contract upon which the 
Horrells base their claim, the same burden should be applied to each party. 
Many courts adopting the preponderance standard do so because the 
elements of the incendiarism or misrepresentation defenses do not mirror fraud. 
Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Fac, 593 A.2d 491, 495 (Conn. 1991). In 
neither defense need the insurer prove that the insured intended to deceive it, nor 
must the insurer prove that it relied upon the insured's representations to its 
damage. 
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There is no authority for the Horrells' proposition that because incendiarism 
is also a crime, a higher standard should apply. On the contrary, the Utah Su-
preme Court has held that where a defendant alleges a crime as an affirmative 
defense in a civil action, the preponderance of the evidence standard applies. Auto 
West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286 (Utah 1984). 
The significant public policy in deterring incendiarism and the difficulty in 
proving the defense also warrant application of the normal civil burden. If a 
higher burden were imposed, the ability of insurers to prove incendiarism would 
be eliminated. Dairy Queen of Fairbanks v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 748 
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Alaska 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has held that arson can 
be proven by circumstantial evidence because it is often secretly planned and 
initiated. State v. Dronzack, 671 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1983). The fact that a 
stigma may attach to the crime of arson is insufficient to raise the standard of 
proof. 
Utah Farm Bureau's claims are not those of "avoidance." The Utah Supreme 
Court has already held that when an insurer asserts an exclusion to coverage as an 
affirmative defense, the exclusion need only be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 27 
(Utah 1968). 
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II. The trial court did not err in concluding that its error was harmful. 
This determination should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Ras-
mussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
The Horrells argue that the jury already concluded that Mr. Horrell did not 
start the fire. However, this is based upon a comparison of separate bodies of 
evidence. When asked to determine whether Mr. Horrell set the fire, the jury was 
allowed to consider all evidence presented at trial. However, when determining 
whether the claim was fairly debatable, the jury could consider only that evidence 
known to Utah Farm Bureau at the time of the denial. Thus, the Horrells' 
argument that the jury's determination with respect to the fairly debatable issue is 
controlling with respect to the issue of whether Mr. Horrell set the fire is 
comparing "apples and oranges." 
Between the time the claim was denied and the trial, Utah Farm Bureau 
obtained even more evidence indicating that Mr. Horrell set the fire, evidence 
which the jury could not consider when making its fairly debatable determination. 
While the Horrells may dispute this evidence: "The jury, not the appellate court, 
should weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility." State v. Brown, 853 
P.2d 851, 860 (Utah 1992). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
ORIGINALLY REQUIRED WAS INCORRECT, 
The trial court correctly concluded that it erred by requiring Utah Farm 
Bureau to prove its defenses of incendiarism and misrepresentation by "clear and 
convincing evidence" rather than a "preponderance of the evidence." The trial 
court's conclusion is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority from 
other jurisdictions and analogous decisions from the Utah Supreme Court. 
Therefore, the trial court's order granting Utah Farm Bureau's motion for new 
trial should be affirmed. 
A. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF COURTS APPLY 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD. 
The parties agree that vast majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue 
have held that an insurer must prove its defense of incendiarism and misrepresenta-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court of Connecticut 
surveyed the case law in 1988 and concluded that twenty-two states found the 
preponderance of the evidence standard to be applicable while only three applied 
a clear and convincing standard: 
We have examined case law from twenty-five states that have 
considered the standard of proof in a civil arson case. Twenty-two 
states have applied the preponderance of the evidence rule: Mueller 
v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Alabama, 475 So.2d 554 (Ala. 1985); Godwin 
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v. Farmers Ins. Co. of America, 129 Ariz. 416, 631 P.2d 571 (1981); 
Haynes v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Arkansas, 11 Ark.App. 
289, 669 S.W.2d 511 (1984); Lawson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Ins. Co., 41 Colo. App. 362, 585 P.2d 318 (1978); Precision 
Printers, Inc., v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 890, 334 
S.E.2d 914 (1985); Dean v. Ins. Co. of North America, 453 N.E.2d 
1187 (Ind. App. 1983); Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 236 Kan. 767, 
696 P.2d 372 (1985); Clifton v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. 
Co., 510 So.2d 759 (La. App. 1987); Trempe v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 20 Mass.App. 448, 480 N.E.2d 670 (1985); United 
Gratiot Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Michigan Basic Property Ins. Ass., 
159 Mich.App. 94, 406 N.W.2d 239 (1987); DeMarais v. North Star 
Mutual Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. App. 1987); Britton v. 
Farmers Ins. Group (Truck Insurance Exchange), 111 P.2d 303 
(Mont. 1986); Italian Fisherman, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assur-
ance & Co., 215 N.J.Super. 278, 521 A.2d 912, cert, denied, 107 
N.J. 152, 526 A.2d 211 (1987); Yassoo Enterprises, Inc. v. North 
Carolina Joint Underwriting Assn., 73 N.D. App. 52, 325 S.E.2d 
677 (1985); Zajac v. Great American Ins. Cos., 410 N.W.2d 155 
(N.D. 1987); Caserta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Ohio App.3d 167, 470 
N.E.2d 430 (1983); Seals, Inc. v. Tioga County Grange Mutual Ins. 
Co., 359 Pa.Super. 606, 519 A.2d 951 (1986); Rutledge v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 360, 334 S.E.2d 131 (1985); 
Raphtis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., S.D. 491, 198 N.W.2d 
505 (1972); Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Speakman, 736 S.W.2d 
874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987); Huff v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. 
Co., 716 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. App. 1986); Great American Ins. Co. 
v. K & W Log, Inc., 22 Wash. App. 468, 591 P.2d 457 (1979); 
Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 
App. 1986). Three jurisdictions have applied the clear and convincing 
evidence standard: Schultz v. Republic Ins. Co., 124 111.App.3d 342, 
464 N.E.2d 767 (1984); Hutt v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 
95 App.Div.2d 255, 466 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1983); Northwestern National 
Ins. Co. v. Nemetz, 135 Wis.2d 245, 400 N.W.2d 33 (1986). 
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Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 693, 695-96, n.2 (Conn. 1988).5 A 
survey of current cases reveals that twenty-nine jurisdictions find that incendiarism 
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas only three find that 
the defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The leading treatise 
has also concluded: 
As a matter of law, a defense of incendiarism is not sustained unless 
the evidence creates a reasonable inference of [the] insured's guilt. 
Evidence does not need to be clear and convincing but rather the 
insurer must prove its defense by the preponderance of the evidence. 
18 George J. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 74:667 (1983). 
The Horrells can find only four cases to support their contention that the 
incendiarism defense should be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
Carpenter v. Union Ins. Soc, 284 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1960); Mize v. Hartford Ins. 
Co., 567 F.Supp. 550 (W.D. Va. 1982); McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 
5The Verrastro court found only three jurisdictions that applied a clear and 
convincing standard: New York, Wisconsin and Illinois. Since Verrastro, 
Illinois has adopted the preponderance standard. Fittje v. Calhoun County Mut. 
County Fire Ins. Co., 552 N.E. 2d 353 (111. Ct. App. 1990). Mississippi 
adopted a clear and convincing standard. McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 
2d 632 (Miss. 1988). Three other states (in addition to Connecticut in Ver-
rastro) have since adopted the preponderance standard. Dairy Queen of Fair-
banks, Inc., v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, 748 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 
1988); Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 780 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1989); 
Bateman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 814 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1991). Iowa adopted the preponderance standard in 1944 and Oklahoma in 
1969. Koontz v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Van Buren County, 16 N.W.2d 20 
(Iowa 1944); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Frank, 452 P.2d 794 (Okla. 1969). 
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632 (Miss. 1988); Hutt v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 466 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. 
App. 1983). 
However, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Carpenter (applying South Carolina 
law), has been implicitly overruled by the South Carolina Court of Appeals. 
Rutledge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 334 S.E.2d 131 (S.C. Ct.App. 
1985). Thus, only three cases cited by the Horrells have continuing force.6 
B. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE APPLICATION OF THE 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD. 
Those courts requiring that the incendiarism defense be proven by "clear and 
convincing" evidence rationalize that the incendiarism and misrepresentation 
exclusions in the policy are "like fraud." McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So.2d 
632, 635 (Miss. 1988). Another Court has held that because incendiarism is also 
a crime, a higher standard should apply. Mize v. Hartford Ins. Co., 567 F.Supp. 
550, 552 (W.D.Va. 1982). These contentions have been rejected by the better 
reasoned cases from this and other jurisdictions. 
6
 There is an issue as to whether the McGory decision would require the 
insurer to prove its defense under the "concealment" clause, also at issue here, 
by clear and convincing evidence. Hall v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 937 
F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1991)(the elements of "concealment" differ from those of 
fraud and need only be proven by a prepondernce of the evidence.) 
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1. THE INCENDIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION 
DEFENSES ARE CONTRACTUAL AND SHOULD BE 
ESTABLISHED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVI-
DENCE, 
The better-reasoned cases teach that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard should apply because incendiarism and misrepresentation are contractual 
defenses under the policy. The Utah Supreme Court has long held that an 
exclusion is an affirmative defense which need be proven only by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 
27 (Utah 1968) (see Section C, infra). 
The New Jersey Court of Appeals has concluded that because these defenses 
are contractual in nature, the preponderance standard should apply: 
Defendant does not assert that upon procuring the policy plaintiff 
intended to commit arson. Rather, defendant is claiming that 
plaintiff, through its principal managing agent Fish, deliberately and 
willfully set the fire. This case is not one of equitable fraud. It 
involves the affirmative defenses of arson and fraud and false 
swearing which, if proven, establish a violation of the standard 
provisions of the fire insurance policy ... and relieve defendant from 
any responsibility for plaintiff's fire loss. Where, as here, the 
plaintiff—insured has intentionally set fire to the property covered by 
the policy of insurance, sound principles of public policy preclude 
recovery. 
Italian Fisherman, Inc. v. Commercial UnionAssur. Co., 521 A.2d 912, 913 (NJ. 
Ct. App. 1987). The Kansas Supreme Court has likewise held that the incendia-
rism or misrepresentation defenses are contractual and do not state a claim for fraud: 
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The company is not claiming that the insurance contract is void 
because, at the time it was obtained, the insureds had the intent to 
commit arson and collect under the policy. Rather, it claims that the 
Neises committed an unlawful act, arson, or procured its commission, 
which is a simple breach of contract. Strong principles of public 
policy deny the insured the right to recover when he intentionally sets 
on fire property covered by the insurance contract. 
Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 696 P.2d 372, 378 (Kan. 1985). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has also held that the incendiarism and misrepresentation defenses 
are contractual in nature: 
The case was actually tried on a breach of contract theory, and breach 
of contract is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear 
and convincing evidence. The terms of the policy stated that the 
insurance company would not pay if someone burned his own 
property; the policy language clearly includes the defenses of 
dishonest and criminal acts in addition to the defense of fraud. 
Finally, public policy would not allow recovery under a contract of 
insurance where the insured started his own fire. 
Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 780 P.2d 116, 123-23 (Idaho 1989). Finally, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court has held as follows: 
Finally, we note that in the case of an insurance contract, the 
consequence of the alleged concealment or misrepresentation is the 
forfeiture of a contractual benefit, and therefore the burden of proof 
normally applicable to contractual claims, the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, should control. . . . We therefore disagree with 
the plaintiffs contention that common law fraud and an insurer's 
defense of concealment or misrepresentation are sufficiently similar 
to warrant applying an elevated burden of proof to the latter. 
Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Fac, 593 A.2d 491, 495 (Conn. 1991). 
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In this case, the Horrells sued Utah Farm Bureau for breach of contract 
alleging that it had an obligation to provide benefits for a covered occurrence. 
Utah Farm Bureau raised as affirmative defenses the fact that the Horrells' fire 
was not a covered loss because the policy provisions did not cover intentional acts 
(such as incendiarism) and losses where the insured made misrepresentations in 
relation to the claim. Utah Farm Bureau did not counterclaim against Mr. Horrell 
and allege all nine elements of common law fraud. The entire action was tried as 
a "breach of contract" action, and indeed the Horrells did not even allege non-
contract claims. 
To hold that incendiarism must be proven by clear and convincing evidence 
would impose an unfair burden upon one party to the contract. Such a rule would 
allow the Horrells to prove a breach of one provision of the agreement by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, while requiring Utah Farm Bureau to prove the 
application of another provision of the same contract by a much higher burden. 
The Horrells' attempts to transform Utah Farm Bureau's contractual defenses into 
a "fraud" action should be rejected, and the trial court's order granting a new trial 
should be affirmed. 
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2. THE INCENDIARISM AND MISREPRESENTA-
TION DEFENSES ARE NOT COMPARABLE TO 
FRAUD. 
Many courts adopting the preponderance standard do so because the 
elements of the incendiarism or misrepresentation defense do not mirror fraud. For 
example, in Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Fac, 593 A.2d 491, 495 (Conn. 
1991), the Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the plaintiffs argument that the 
misrepresentation exclusion was "like fraud": 
Our conclusion is supported by the distinction between the 
elements of common law fraud and the elements of an insurer's 
defense of concealment or misrepresentation. An insurer who raises 
this special defense must prove only that the insured wilfully 
concealed or misrepresented a material fact with the intention of 
deceiving the insurer. Chauser v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 
413, 423, 196 A. 137 (1937). Unlike a party asserting a cause of 
action for common law fraud, an insurer who raises the special 
defense of concealment or misrepresentation does not have to prove 
that the insurer actually relied on the concealment or misrepresenta-
tion or that the insurer suffered injury. 
Id. Similarly, in St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Salovich, 705 P.2d 812, 815 
(Wash. App. 1985), the Washington Court of Appeals held: 
However, courts from other jurisdictions have distinguished between 
cases involving misrepresentations to induce the execution of the 
contract, in which fraud must be established, and cases involving 
misrepresentations in a claim for coverage under the contract, in 
which fraud need not be established. While direct proof of misrepre-
sentation by the insured in an insurance claim is seldom available, and 
the insurer often has no choice but to rely on the words of the insured 
in ascertaining the facts involved in the loss, the insurer need not 
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establish reliance, an essential element of fraud, in order to deny 
coverage for such misrepresentation. 
Id. at 814-15. 
Here, the Utah Farm Bureau policy provided as follows: 
Concealment of Fraud. The entire policy will be void if, whether 
before or after a loss, an insured has: 
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material 
fact or circumstance; 
b. engaged in any fraudulent conduct; or 
c. made false statements. 
R. 21. Utah Farm Bureau alleged that Mr. Horrell "has intentionally made 
misrepresentations of material fact relating to his loss" by denying that he 
intentionally set the fire. R. 21. Utah Farm Bureau did not raise as an affirmative 
defense that Mr. Horrell "engaged in any fraudulent conduct." 
In order to state a claim for fraud in Utah, a party must prove nine 
elements: 
(1) that a misrepresentation was made (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the repre-
sentor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that 
there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a represen-
tation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it 
and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act 
(9) to that party's injury or damage. 
Educators Mut. Ins. Assoc, v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 1032 
(Utah 1995). 
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As in the cases from other jurisdictions cited above, Utah Farm Bureau was 
not required to prove elements (5)-(9) in order to prove its affirmative defense 
under the policy. Utah Farm Bureau need only prove that a misrepresentation of 
a material fact was made. Thus, the Horrells' claim that this action is "like fraud" 
fails and the trial court's order granting a new trial should be affirmed. 
The incendiarism exclusion under the policy is even less analogous to a 
fraud action. Utah Farm Bureau need not prove that any material misrepresenta-
tion was made, nor must it prove that Mr. Horrell intended to deceive Utah Farm 
Bureau or that it relied upon the misrepresentations. In fact, Utah Farm Bureau 
need not prove a single element of the "fraud" claim to state an incendiarism 
defense. 
The Horrells' contention that the incendiarism and misrepresentation 
defenses are "like fraud" has been rejected by the overwhelming majority of courts 
because there is no relation between the common law fraud action and the breach 
of contract due to incendiarism or misrepresentation defense. The trial court's 
order granting Utah Farm Bureau's motion for new trial should be affirmed. 
3, THE CRIMINAL NATURE OF ARSON SHOULD 
NOT ALTER THE CIVIL BURDEN OF PROOF. 
As set forth above, one court has ruled that the incendiarism and misrepre-
sentation defenses must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence" because 
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arson is also a crime. McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So.2d 632, 635 (Miss. 
1988). However, the Horrells have presented no authority from the Utah Supreme 
Court requiring that criminal acts be proven by clear and convincing evidence in 
civil cases. 
On the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court has held that where a defendant 
alleges a crime as an affirmative defense in a civil action, the preponderance of the 
evidence standard applies. Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286 (Utah 1984). 
In Baggs, the defendant counterclaimed against the plaintiffs alleging slander. 
Specifically, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs had told third parties that he 
had "embezzled" or "stolen" from the company. The plaintiffs defended the 
counterclaim based upon the truth of the statements. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that the plaintiffs need only prove the truth of their embezzlement claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
We adopt the general rule that where a crime is imputed to a plaintiff 
and a defendant pleads truth as a defense, he need not prove the truth 
of the assertion "beyond a reasonable doubt, and a preponderance of 
evidence is sufficient to bar recovery." 
Id. at 291. 
Certainly, the Horrells would agree that an accusation of embezzlement 
carries a stigma equal to that of fraud.7 Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court 
7
 Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme Court equated the two charges. 
McGory, 527 So.2d at 635. 
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allowed the defense to prove the stigmatizing crime of "embezzlement" in a civil 
action by a mere preponderance of the evidence. There is no reason why Utah 
Farm Bureau, notwithstanding the alleged stigma, should be held to a higher 
burden when proving that Mr. Horrell breached the "intentional act" exclusion of 
the policy. 
The Horrells present no Utah authority to support their contention that 
criminal acts must be proven by a higher quantum of evidence in civil cases. 
Indeed, much of tort law is merely an extension of the criminal code. For 
example, the tort concept of "wrongful death" is similar to "negligent homicide." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-206 (1995). The civil action for "assault and battery" 
mirrors the crime of "assault." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (1995). Indeed, even 
driving infractions such as "speeding," "following too closely," and "failing to 
signal," have criminal consequences. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-1 et seq. (1994). 
Yet neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever required that these tort 
actions be proven by clear and convincing evidence simply because the elements 
are analogous to a crime. 
Indeed, each of these civil actions requires only a preponderance of the 
evidence for that very reason - each is a civil action and no criminal sanctions are 
sought. Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has never required more than a 
preponderance standard in breach of contract actions. Whitlock v. Old American 
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Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1968). Utah Farm Bureau can 
perceive no basis for allowing the Horrells to pursue their breach of contract claim 
using traditional contract standards, while requiring Utah Farm Bureau to pursue 
its breach of contract claims under criminal or fraud standards. There is no Utah 
authority for such an imbalance in the burdens of proof, and the Horrells argument 
should be rejected. 
4. THE NATURE OF THE INCENDIARISM DEFENSE 
WARRANTS A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
STANDARD. 
Many courts have accurately noted that incendiarism is difficult to prove 
because there are rarely eye-witnesses to the "striking of the match." Great 
American Ins. Co. v. K & WLog, Inc., 591 P.2d 457 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); 
Christensen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 552 So. 2d 1377 (La. Ct. App. 
1989). For example, in Great American Ins. Co., the Washington Court of 
Appeals stated: 
Arson is an offense which is most often proved by circumstantial 
evidence. It is one of those crimes which is peculiarly of secret 
preparation and commission; and it is seldom that the prosecution can 
furnish testimony of an eye witness who observed the setting of the 
fire. 
Great American Ins. Co., 591 P.2d at 460. The Louisiana Court of Appeals has 
also stated: 
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At this point, we recognize a distinct observation from our jurispru-
dential experience, that the very act of arson necessitates an envi-
ronment where there are no witnesses and little direct evidence 
pointing towards the responsible party. 
Christens en, 552 So. 2d at 1379. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the difficulty in proving 
criminal arson: 
In viewing the case in light of the totality of the evidence, the offense 
may be established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may be 
the only way of establishing a case of arson, which usually is based 
on secret preparation and activity. 
State v. Dronzack, 671 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1983). 
For this reason, the majority of courts have held that an insurer meets its 
burden of proof by setting forth sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish each 
of the following elements: 
(1) the incendiary nature of the fire; 
(2) that the insureds had a motive for setting the fire, and 
(3) surrounding circumstantial evidence implicating the appellants in 
setting the fire or causing it to be set. 
Emasco Ins, Co. v. Waymire, 788 P.2d 1357, 1360 (Mont. 1990). See, also, State 
Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Polasek, 847 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); 
McReynolds v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 815 P.2d 208, 211 (Tenn App. 1991); Moore 
v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 444 N.E.2d 220 (111. Ct. App. 1982). 
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To impose a higher evidentiary burden upon insurers already required to 
prove a claim with largely circumstantial evidence would essentially eliminate the 
incendiarism defense altogether because the insurer would be required to present 
direct evidence that the insured lit the fire, evidence which the careful arsonist 
would not provide. 
The Horrells contend that to allow the incendiarism defense to be proven 
applying the same standard as in all other civil cases would essentially require 
them to prove that they did not set the fire. However, they do not present any 
basis for this conclusion. The insurer already has the heavy burden of presenting 
sufficient circumstantial evidence that the insured set the fire intentionally. This 
alone provides sufficient protection for the Horrells. 
Moreover, the burden of contradicting the evidence presented by Utah Farm 
Bureau is no greater in this case than in any other civil case. The Horrells 
retained the services of their own cause and origin investigator, John Blundell, to 
help them disprove that Mr. Horrell set the fire. They called in their case in chief 
certain firefighters and neighbors to negate Utah Farm Bureau's theory that Mr. 
Horrell set the fire. 
Under the preponderance standard, the Horrells would be treated no 
differently from any civil plaintiff facing a contention that he or she was 
contributorily negligent. In fact, no more would be required of the Horrells to 
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defend against Utah Farm Bureau's claim that Mr. Horrell breached the policy 
than was expected of Utah Farm Bureau in defending against the Horrells' claims 
that it breached the contract. 
Utah Farm Bureau was already disadvantaged in this suit because it was 
required to prove its claim by circumstantial evidence, whereas the Horrells could 
prove their contentions by largely direct evidence from the insurer's claim file. To 
magnify this disadvantage when both claims arise out of the same contract would 
be manifestly unfair to Utah Farm Bureau. 
5. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS MANDATE IMPOSITION 
OF THE NORMAL CIVIL STANDARD OF PROOF. 
The Horrells freely admit that those committing arson should not benefit 
from their acts by recovering insurance. Application of the civil burden of the 
preponderance of the evidence is the only manner in which to effectuate this public 
policy. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska has held that application of the preponderance 
of the evidence standard is the only manner in which to advance the public policy 
underlying the incendiarism defense: 
Perhaps more importantly, these courts recognize that ,f[s]trong 
principles of public policy deny the insured the right to recover when 
he intentionally sets on fire property covered by his insurance 
contract. Neises, 696 P.2d at 378. It would hinder this public policy 
to require proof by a higher standard than usual for civil cases. 
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Dairy Queen of Fairbanks v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 748 P.2d 1169, 1172 
(Alaska 1988). 
The Utah Legislature has not hesitated to maintain the normal preponderance 
standard when public policy requires. For example, while punitive damages 
generally must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, this standard does not 
apply to claims that a tort-feasor was driving under the influence of alcohol. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (l)(b) (1992). 
As set forth above, if the clear and convincing evidence standard were 
applied, the insurer would rarely be able to meet its burden. An insured exercising 
even the slightest care would be able to recover benefits because there would never 
be an eye-witness to the crime and therefore, the insurer would rarely be able to 
prove its case such that there was no "substantial doubt" as to who started the fire, 
which is necessary under the clear and convincing instruction given in this case. 
R. 1082. The only manner in which to effectuate the public policy of denying 
arsonists financial gain is to allow the insurer to prove its claims by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 
6. THE HORRELLS' ARGUMENT THAT ARSON CARRIES 
A "STIGMA" SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
Stripped to its essence, the Horrells' claim is ultimately that a higher burden 
should apply because an allegation of misrepresentation and incendiarism carries 
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a "stigma." This is an inadequate basis to impose a higher burden of proof upon 
Utah Farm Bureau. 
The Horrells' argument largely follows one case. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. 
Bloomfield, 637 P.2d 176, 180 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). Like much of the authority 
relied upon by the Horrells, Bloomfield has been overruled. Mutual of Enumclaw 
Ins. Co. v. McBride, 667 P.2d 494 (Or. 1983). In McBride, the Supreme Court 
of Oregon held that the defenses of incendiarism and misrepresentation need only 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. When faced with a "stigma" 
argument similar to that made by the Horrells, the court responded: 
We applied a similar consideration in Fahrenwald v. Hemphill, supra, 
where we said that a reason for requiring clear and convincing proof 
of fraud is that "[t]he stigma of fraud is not lightly laid upon a 
defendant." . . . This was, however, little more than a maxim, and 
more analysis is required to establish whether the statutory action for 
insurance fraud and false swearing alleged at bar is quasi-criminal or 
threatens the individual involved with "a significant depravation of 
liberty or stigma." 
Here, the consequences of fraud and false swearing is solely the 
forfeiture of a contractual benefit. 
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. McBride, 667 P.2d 494, 499 (Or. 1983). 
In fact, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has noted that: 
A majority of the states that have examined the burden of proof in 
civil arson cases have adopted the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. This rule has been applied in jurisdictions, like Connecticut, 
that have adopted the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for 
proof of fraud in a civil action. 
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Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Conn. 1988). Thus, even 
those courts recognizing that fraud imposes a stigma sufficient to warrant a higher 
burden of proof have not found the stigma sufficient to impose a greater burden 
in breach of contract actions. 
Many civil actions impose a "stigma." An assault case implies that the actor 
is a "bully." A wrongful death case imposes the stigma of being responsible, either 
intentionally or negligently, for taking another life. The Horrells claim that the 
defenses asserted by Utah Farm Bureau imply that he is a "cheat." However, do 
not the Horrells' contentions that Utah Farm Bureau is denying them insurance 
proceeds to which they are allegedly entitled also imply that Utah Farm Bureau is 
a "cheat"? If a civil litigant could raise the burden required of his adversary 
simply by contending that the claims cast him in a poor light with his fellow 
citizens, clear and convincing evidence would be the rule rather than the 
exception. The Horrells' "stigma" argument is nothing more than a veiled attempt 
to gain a litigation advantage in this case. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the Horrells brought this claim. They have 
placed the circumstances of the fire and the performance of the contract into issue. 
To allow them to close off a part of this inquiry by contending that a stigma will 
result is unfair to the party they are suing. The Horrells' stigma argument should 
be rejected and the trial court's order mandating a new trial should be affirmed. 
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C. UTAH FARM BUREAU DOES NOT SEEK TO AVOID THE 
CONTRACT AND THUS, A HIGHER STANDARD OF PROOF 
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED. 
The Horrells contend that anytime an insurance company asserts an 
exclusion in the policy as an affirmative defense, the insurer should be required 
to prove that exclusion by clear and convincing evidence because an exclusion is 
an "avoidance" of the contract. This assertion is contrary to Utah law and the 
public policy underlying the "avoidance" decisions. 
The Utah Supreme Court has already held that where an insurer invokes an 
exclusion in the policy to deny coverage, the insurer need only prove its defense 
by a preponderance of the evidence: 
In that connection it is well to have in mind the burden of proof as to 
the problem here presented: Where a loss occurs which normally 
would be compensable under an insurance policy, and the company 
asserts a defense of non-coverage on the ground of an exception in the 
policy, the general rule of insurance law is that this is in the nature 
of an affirmative defense; and that the company has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the loss comes within 
the exception stated in the policy. 
Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1968). 
Thus, even if Utah Farm Bureau's defense can be called one of "avoidance," the 
Utah Supreme Court has already held that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard should apply. 
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In addition, the public policy underlying the "avoidance" cases cited by the 
Horrells is not applicable to this case. In Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360, 
1362 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court identified the types of cases to which 
the clear and convincing standard applies: 
Among the classes of cases to which this special standard of per-
suasion (clear and convincing proof) has been applied are the 
following: (1) charges of fraud, and undue influence, (2) suits on oral 
contracts to make a will, and suits to establish the terms of a lost will, 
(3) suits for the specific performance of an oral contract, (4) proceed-
ings to set aside, reform, or modify written transactions or official 
acts on the grounds of fraud, mistake, or incompleteness, and (5) 
miscellaneous types of claims and defenses, varying from state to 
state, where there is thought to be special danger of deception, or 
where the court considers that the particular type of claim should be 
disfavored on policy grounds. 
Id. In Peterson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant holding a joint account 
with his wife must prove that the funds are not his by "clear and convincing 
evidence" because there is a "special danger of deception." Id. at 1362. 
Each of these cases involves a situation where it is "one person's word 
against another." The Court held that in these cases, the person asserting the claim 
and seeking to avoid a valid contract must set forth clear and convincing evidence 
and cannot rely solely upon his own testimony or evidence which he controls and 
which is not subject to proof. 
There is no "special danger" of deception in an incendiarism case. The case 
is not proven based solely upon the testimony of one witness, but rather is based 
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almost entirely upon the physical evidence. Utah Farm Bureau does not have sole 
control over the evidence. On the contrary, all of the evidence in this case was in 
the sole possession of the Horrells. This case is not unlike any other civil tort 
case, where evidence is adduced from the other party. The cases cited by the 
Horrells alleging "avoidance" are simply not applicable here. On the contrary, the 
Utah Supreme Court has already held that an exclusion in an insurance policy need 
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
In sum, the overwhelming weight of authority and the compelling public 
policy arguments support allowing an insurer to prove that the insured breached 
the contract by a preponderance of the evidence. For this reason, the trial court's 
order granting a new trial should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE ERROR REGARDING THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS 
HARMFUL. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT 
ABSENT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The trial court ordered a new trial on the grounds that Utah Farm Bureau 
was erroneously required to show incendiarism by clear and convincing evidence 
rather than a preponderance of the evidence. In doing so, the Court implicitly 
found that its error was harmful and warranted a new trial. This Court has very 
recently held: 
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We will not reverse a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
for new trial absent an abuse of discretion. 
Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Utah 
Supreme Court long ago stated the purpose for vesting broad discretion in the trial 
court: 
Due to the considerations set forth above, and the advantaged position 
the trial court occupies with respect to the trial, the prior decisions of 
this court have been uniformly to the effect that the trial court has a 
broad discretion in ruling on motions for a new trial and that his 
action will not be disturbed in the absence of a plain abuse thereof. 
Holmes v. Nelson, 326 P.2d 722, 726 (Utah 1958). In this case, the trial judge, 
who had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, is far better equipped to 
determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of a different outcome if the 
proper burden were imposed. This Court should not overturn the trial court's 
determination absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. The Horrells 
have ignored their burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE ORIGINAL ERROR WAS HARMFUL. 
The Horrells' only argument with respect to harmless error is that a 
comparison of the jury's response to separate special verdict questions regarding 
different claims proves that the jury believed Greg Horrell did not intentionally set 
fire to his own home. However, this argument fails because the jury was asked 
to determine separate issues based upon the evidence existing at different times. 
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Initially, the jury was asked to determine whether Mr. Horrell set the fire. 
Question 1 of the special verdict inquired: 
1. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Gregory 
Horrell intentionally set the fire which occurred at his residence 
on October 3, 1990? 
(R. 1122, attached as Exhibit "G"). The jury was allowed to consider all of the 
evidence adduced during trial, regardless of whether the evidence was discovered 
before or after the claim was denied by Utah Farm Bureau. 
However, when considering whether the claim was "fairly debatable," the 
jury was allowed to consider only that evidence in the possession of Utah Farm 
Bureau at the time it denied the Horrells' claim. The jury was asked: 
6. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Hor-
rell's claim was "fairly debatable" as that term has been defined 
in the instructions? 
(R. 1123, attached as Exhibit "G"). "Fairly debatable" was defined in the 
instructions as follows: 
"Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which support the 
insurer's position create a reasonable likelihood that the denial of the 
claim would be upheld in court. In determining whether or not the 
insurer's position was fairly debatable and reasonably justified, you 
should consider all laws or facts upon which a reasonable insurance 
company would rely in deciding whether to pay a claim. This would 
include the laws or facts supporting the insured's position that were 
either known, or that should have been known, by the insurer. 
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(R. 1097, attached as Exhibit "H"). In reaching its decision regarding Question 
6, the jury was limited to the evidence at the time the claim was denied* Thus, 
an evaluation of the Horrells' argument demonstrates that they are seeking to 
"compare apples and oranges." 
After the claim was denied in March, 1992, the Horrells brought this 
lawsuit. During discovery in this suit, substantial additional evidence was gained 
showing that Mr. Horrell set the fires to his home, including: 
1. At the time of Mr. Robert Jacobsen's report in February, 1991, law 
enforcement officials such as Randy Jacobson of the South Salt Lake Fire 
Department refused to discuss the matter because of the on-going criminal 
investigation. (See Report of Robert Jacobsen, attached as Exhibit "A"). 
However, at the time of trial, Mr. Randy Jacobson testified that in his 
opinion, the fire was incendiary and Mr. Horrell set the fire. R. 2725-2729. 
2. At the time of Mr. Jake Jacobsen's cause and origin report, the 
assumption was that the second fire was a "rekindle" of the first fire. This 
was based upon the fact that Mr. Horrell stated in his statement that he was 
given a ride by a Red Cross volunteer to his mother-in-law's home shortly 
after first fire. Mr. Horrell even produced the volunteer's business card to 
positively identify this individual. R. 2948. However, at trial, the Red Cross 
volunteer denied ever giving Mr. Horrell a ride. R. 2848-49. 
8
 Although not necessary for its ruling, the trial court stated as follows 
in granting the new trial: 
THE COURT: The Court is persuaded that there is substantial 
evidence that the claims were fairly debatable. I make no finding 
thereon, but simply make the observation. 
(Ruling, attached as Exhibit "I"). 
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3. In addition, at the time of Mr. Jake Jacobsen's report, he relied upon 
Mr. Don C. Herbert's statement that he saw power lines arcing shortly 
before the second fire began. R. 1842. However, during discovery in this 
lawsuit, Mr. Kenneth R. Rigby, an employee of Utah Power, testified that 
he was called shortly after the first fire a that he knows "for a fact I cut the 
power." R. 2172. Mr. Norman Tateoka, an other employee of Utah Power, 
testified that when he arrived on the morning after the second fire to turn off 
the power, it was already off.9 
4. In his statement to Mr. Jake Jacobsen, Mr. Horrell indicated that 
while he maintained insurance on his vehicles, he did not maintain insurance 
on his boats. (See Report of Robert Jacobsen, attached as Exhibit "A"). 
During discovery in this litigation, Mr. Horrell conceded that he had not 
maintained insurance on his vehicles, his business, or any property other 
than the home. R. 1593.10 
5. In 1986, Mr. Horrell's mother, Shirley Horrell, sent Greg Horrell a 
check in the amount of $40,000 made payable to the mortgagee, Arlene 
Beckstrom, for full payment of the home. R. 2926. Ms. Beckstrom testified 
that she received only a portion of those funds. R. 2317.11 
6. Mr. Horrell reported receiving $2,400 rental income from a home in 
Alaska in 1989, but failed to report this income to the Internal Revenue 
Service on his 1989 income tax return. R. 1585-1586. 
9
 In conjunction with Mr. Horrell's false statement regarding the Red Cross 
volunteer, these facts show that Mr. Horrell had an opportunity to set the 
second fire. Moreover, Mr. Rigby's testimony eliminates the possibility that 
the second fire was caused by electrical failure. 
10
 The implication of such testimony is that Mr. Horrell may have chosen to 
destroy the home because it was the only property from which he could obtain 
insurance benefits. 
11
 The implication of such testimony is that Mr. Horrell could not obtain 
help from his mother in order to avoid the 1990 mortgage foreclosure because 
she assumed that the loan had been paid. 
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7. Mr. Horrell claimed in his Examination under Oath before the claim 
was denied that his income tax returns were destroyed in the fire, but at trial 
he admitted that he did not even prepare income tax returns for the years 
1984-1989 until February, 1991, three months after the fire and that he had 
copies of the returns he could have given to Farm Bureau but assumed for 
no particular reason that Farm Bureau only wanted certified copies. R. 
1591-1592. 
8. Although Utah Farm Bureau was aware that Mr. Horrell had problems 
with creditors prior to the fire, it was not revealed until discovery in this 
action that Mr. Horrell had not made any payments to Utah Power & Light 
since June 25, 1990. R. 2944. 
When considering whether the claim was fairly debatable, the jury could 
consider only that evidence in the possession of Utah Farm Bureau, which 
excluded the above evidence. In determining whether Mr. Horrell set the fire, the 
jury could consider both the evidence known to Utah Farm Bureau plus the above 
evidence. 
In other words, it is entirely possible for the jury to conclude by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the claim was not fairly debatable when 
considering only the evidence in Utah Farm Bureau's possession, but also conclude 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Horrell set the fire based upon all of 
the evidence. To equate the two findings, as the Horrells argue should be done, 
would necessarily require this Court to hold, as a matter of law, that the 
information learned after Utah farm Bureau denied the claim is of no value. There 
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is no basis for such a result because the evidence learned after the denial is 
certainly relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Horrell set the fire. 
The Horrells will characteristically argue that there are plausible explana-
tions for each of the above facts, and they will undoubtedly argue that other 
witnesses negate the importance of these assertions. However, as the Utah 
Supreme Court has correctly found: "The jury, not the appellate court, should 
weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 
860 (Utah 1992). In this case, it is for the jury to decide how much importance to 
attach to each of the above facts. 
The Horrells' argument should be rejected because it erroneously assumes 
that the jury was considering the same body of evidence when responding to each 
inquiry on the special verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering a new trial based upon harmful error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Utah Farm Bureau respectfully requests that the 
trial court's ruling granting a new trial be affirmed. 
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DATED this Id day of August, 1995. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
An y\A\iAAJ Jj 
'Stephen G. Morgan 
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PRIVILEGED/CONFIDENTIAL REPORT 
PRELIMINARY REPORT 
Utah Farm Bureau 
5300 South 360 West, #210 
Murray, Utah 84123 
ATTN: Jerry Schaft 
INSURED: Greg Horrell 
DATE OP LOSS: 10/3/90 
LOSS DESCRIPTION: Single family dwelling 
LOSS LOCATION: 2770 South Main (rear) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
POLICY/CLAIM #: 5193692 
EVIDENCE LOCATION: Evidence lock-up of this office 
BPA PILE #: 90-1170 SL 
OCCUPANT/OWNER: Same 
CAUSE AND ORIGIN: Arson or incendiary fire that occurred in 
utility room of first level through the 
use of a suspected flammable liquid. A 
subsequent second fire occurred in the 
approximate same area of origin shortly 
after extinguishment which is also 
suspected to be incendiary in nature. 
This report is confidential and the exclusive privileged property 
of the addressee. Dissemination of this report or any content of 
the same to anyone is the sole responsibility of the addressee. 
Special Investigations and Consultants 
<c?TnciLU*Ll*L 
"Out £e/wtit*£ Coxxtt St Hjoux But {PxoUcUon 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
Preliminary Report 
Utah Farm Bureau 
5300 South 350 West, #210 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Attn: Jerry Schaft 
RE INSURED: 
DATE OF LOSS: 
POLICY #: 
OUR FILE: 
Greg Horrell 
10/03/90 
5192692 
90-1170 SL 
-1- February 4, 1991 90-1170 SL 
ASSIGNMENT: 
This case assignment was received on October 8, 1990 through a 
telephone conversation with Jerry Schaft, Supervisor for Utah Farm 
Bureau Insurance. The concern of this assignment was to conduct an 
origin and cause investigation of a fire that occurred on October 3, 
1990 in the home of the insured, Greg Horrell. This fire was one of 
many bizarre circumstances that occurred at the time of the fire and 
information of those will be provided by law enforcement personnel at 
some point during the investigation, as they had not concluded their 
preliminary investigation at the time of this assignment. 
RISK: 
The fire of concern occurred in a single family residence of 
approximately 1,800 square feet of living space. This was a 
two-story structure that was 2 x 4 framed with a pitched roof. Many 
remodeling projects had occurred to this residence since its time of 
construction. Those projects have not been defined at this point of 
the investigation. It is suspected, however, that this house is 
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approximately 45 years old. 
Exterior surfaces of the roof were of asphalt shingles throughout. 
There was also a multi-paneled solar heating system located on the 
southwest surface of the roof. The inner walls and ceilings were 
both sheetrock and lath and plaster, and even portions of missing 
ceiling coverings which gave the appearance of an unfinished 
remodeling project. 
There was a heating system located in the crawl space below the main 
floor which was not inspected due to the extreme amount of water in 
the crawl space. Attempts to inspect this were impossible as this 
unit was submerged at the time of the investigation. However, a 
solar heating system supplemented the forced air heating unit in the 
partial basement. This was a natural gas forced air heater, unknown 
manufacturer model or serial number. The inner surfaces of the walls 
were painted and wallpapered. There was carpeting on most of the 
floors throughout the residence. 
Electrical service was an overhead supply attached on the north 
center portion of the residence through a weather head and meter base 
mounted at that point. Main breaker panel was mounted directly 
through the wall interiorly in a utility room which also contained a 
washer and dryer, as well as some storage. Within this room, access 
to the partial basement was found. Also found outside at the 
northeast corner was the natural gas service meter. 
INVESTIGATION: 
Due to the fact the fire department had not released the fire scene 
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and an on-going investigation was being conducted, this office made 
contact with South Salt Lake Fire Department to provide a clearance 
to conduct a fire scene investigation. At that time, it was made 
known to this office that Randy Jacobson represented South Salt Lake 
Fire Department in the investigation conducted by that jurisdiction. 
Mr, Jacobson stated that the scene had been released at this point 
and it was clear to conduct an investigation. The insured was also 
called and agreed to meet this office the following day to provide 
access to the residence as well as information about the fire 
incident. 
The preliminary scene investigation was conducted on October 9, 1990 
at which time the external and internal portions of the residence 
were photographed through the use of an Olympus 0M1 35mm SLR camera 
using 24mm wide angle lens and 50mm lenses. Where necessary, flash 
photography was provided through a Vivitar 283 flash attachment. 
Kodacolor Gold 100 film was used in the photographing process. 
Copies of photographs taken during this investigation accompany this 
report. 
This office arrived early on the morning of the day of the 
investigation to find that no one had reported to the residence at 
that time. Therefore, an interview was conducted with Mrs. Meyer who 
lived in the house adjacent to the property to the west. Mrs. Meyer 
was one of the first individuals to notice the fire and provided an 
recorded interview concerning the details and circumstances 
surrounding this fire incident. Later during the day, this office 
met with the insured, Greg Horrell, who was discussing details 
concerning this fire with the South Salt Lake fire investigator and 
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also Detective Diane Hollis of the South Salt Lake Police Department. 
It was at this time it was learned that allegedly gunshots had been 
fired at the insured prior to the fire incident and in relationship 
to the fire. More information and details about these circumstances 
will be discussed later in this report. Mr. Horrell stated that 
prior to the fire, he had been in the shop (business) which is a 
building located to the east of the residence and fronts Main Street 
with some friends participating in some hobby activities up until the 
time of the alleged gunshots and fire incident. Mr. Horrell has a 
wife and two children who were not home at the time this incident 
occurred. 
The external inspection was conducted at this time which revealed 
severe fire damage to the northeast central and west sections of the 
roof and second level. Many of the windows had been broken out of 
the first level and almost all windows and been broken in the upper 
level. The roof had collapsed in the center portion and northeast 
sections of the second level. Severe fire damage had occurred 
throughout the residence. It was learned that a rekindle or 
subsequent second fire occurred at approximately 5:36 a.m. on the day 
following the initial fire incident. The second fire occurred 
approximately two hours after the fire crews had left the scene from 
the initial fire. 
Entrance into the residence was gained through the south center 
portion of the residence known as the den or "yellow room" where 
heavy fire debris and damage was found throughout this room. This 
provided access to all other areas of the home. It was noticed upon 
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the inspection of this room that fire had breached through not only 
the ceiling, but the roof of this room at the north section. 
Attached to the den was a utility room where severe fire damage had 
occurred both to the inner contents of the room and the roof and 
ceiling surfaces. Directly above this area was the piping and supply 
of the liquid coolant for the solar system. It was apparent through 
the inspection of these areas that the most fire damage had occurred 
at this point. It is unknown whether this had occurred in the first 
or second fire. 
It was also obvious, through the inspection of the entire residence, 
that, a large accumulation of debris had been thrown throughout the 
residence subsequent to the fire. In fact, the den appeared to have 
rubble and debris thrown about in a random fashion for purposes 
unknown at the time of this investigation. An appearance of complete 
disarray was found in all of the rooms of the residence including the 
upper level. It also appeared that some of the contents of the 
residence had been removed prior to the involvement of this office. 
The upper floor was inspected to determine burn patterns and the 
travel and extension of fire during both fire incidents. It was 
quickly noticed that on the northeast section of the residence, heavy 
fire damage had occurred at that level. It gave the impression that 
very possibly the first fire may have started in this room. The 
strange configuration of the roof line and the addition of rooms as 
well as spaces of the ceiling that had been removed prior to the fire 
incident caused concerns with the travel of fire and avenue for 
extensions. Those configurations may have accounted for the 
increased burning within this room. However, that has not been 
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confirmed. 
Burn patterns of the first fire were confused and changed due to the 
second fire, but through the interviews conducted with fire 
department personnel, it was learned that the initial fire scene was 
one which involved mostly the heavy involvement of fire in the 
utility room and in the northeast room of the second level. The 
first fire noticed by arriving crews was coming out the north window 
of the second level. 
There very well could have been two points of origin involving the 
first fire. The second fire, very clearly, had involved the utility 
room and den of the main level. It also appeared that fire involved 
the child's bedroom situated on the west side of the first level. 
Both fires included the involvement of an accelerant in the areas of 
origin. Samples of fire debris and control samples were taken at the 
time of this investigation. Those samples were sent to a lab for 
content identification purposes. 
During the inspection of the second level, it was noticed that heavy 
burning and damage occurred on the top surfaces of the floor 
joists/trusses in the room on the northeast corner of the house. A 
roll-over effect from the fire also involved severe damage to the 
east surface ceiling trusses and subroof which gave the appearance of 
an extremely hot, rapidly accelerating fire. A glazed affect on the 
surface confirmed these findings. The large configuration 
alligatoring on the wooden surfaces gave the appearance of an 
accelerated and hot fire. As this office was not involved in the 
investigation after the first fire, the type of burning and damage is 
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not known. 
In talking with fire crews, they indicated that very little fire 
damage had occurred to adjacent rooms in the first level. With the 
exception of the utility room and some burning into the den area, 
most other rooms were intact and free from any extensive fire damage. 
The door to the children's bedroom had been closed and only minor 
smoke damage had occurred in this room after the first fire. 
Due to the location of the fire which occurred in the utility room, 
fire department personnel were concerned with the possibility of the 
electrical panel and circuits being involved with the cause of the 
fire. This panel had been removed prior to the involvement of this 
office by the fire department and was held in their evidence lock-up 
for purposes of analysis. Subsequent investigations conducted by 
this office included the visual inspection of this panel and all 
connective circuitry. It was indicated by the inspection at that 
time that no obvious failures or arcing was evident within this 
panel. It did appear that the damage caused to all circuitry, 
conductors, and components was from external heat. The information 
provided by the insured stated that the power was off earlier that 
day prior to the fire incident. Information also provided by the 
insured stated that there had been no electrical problems with this 
service at any time prior to the fire. In fact, a remodeling project 
a year or two earlier provided a new panel, breakers, and some of the 
electrical circuits throughout the house. 
Also on a subsequent investigation, a visit to the residence and 
business, this office found a notice of Trustee Sale posted on the 
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front door of the office• According to that notice, Associated Title 
under Document #3818010 recorded on the 13th day of July, 1983, Book 
5474, page 2083, involved the sale of the property which included the 
house and business owned by Greg S. and Barbara J. Horrell. This 
sale was to be conducted on October 29, 1990 at 10:00 for the 
purposes of foreclosing on that property and trust deed. 
The specific details leading up to that foreclosure are not known at 
the time of this investigation, but it did appear through information 
provided by other individuals involved that the property and the 
payments were in severe arrears which had forced the foreclosure by 
Associated Title. It is also known by this office and determined 
during the investigation that the property has a second mortgage 
agreement contract with Gordon and Arlene Beckstrom. These 
individuals are the original owners of the home, and the purchase 
agreement through Mr. Horrell was conducted through the Beckstroms. 
The foreclosure being conducted by Associated Title and their 
position in the property liens is not known at this time of the 
investigation. The insured denies there being any other liens and 
encumbrances on the property and there are no other interested 
parties. He also denies that there have been any other encumbrances 
or liens on this property at any other time. The aforementioned 
statements are only a few of many inconsistent statements surfaced 
during this investigation. 
Enclosed with this report are four transcribed interviews taken of 
the insured and the three individuals involved with him on the night 
of this incident. A review of those transcribed statements will 
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provide specific details with regard to matters concerning this 
investigation. However, to provide a synopsis of some of the other 
inconsistencies that are within the transcribed interviews, and also 
an interview taken on the day of the preliminary investigation with 
Mr. Horrell suggest that many items have been reported differently 
throughout the investigation. 
Besides the conflicting statements made during the investigation, 
other items of concern suggest that possible deception or incorrect 
reporting of information by the insured has been conducted. Some of 
these items would be the fact that Mr. Horrell indicates that he has 
had no problems with any of his vendors, obtaining merchandise or 
obtaining credit. During the investigation, several utility bills 
were strewn about the debris and rubble within the house that showed 
not only an extremely large balance due, but indications of 
termination of service with lack of payment. Additionally, canceled 
checks were found for several different checking accounts that Mr. 
Horrell does not admit to during the interview. Of course, of most 
concern is the alleged shooting incident that took place on the 
evening of the fire incident. 
INTERVIEWS: 
In addition to the interviews conducted with eye witnesses and other 
individuals involved with the fire incident on the evening of its 
occurrence, this office talked to fire department personnel and 
neighbors in the area about the fire incident. 
Captain Mike Larson of the South Salt Lake Fire Department indicated 
that his truck was the first unit arriving on the initial fire 
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response at 11:29 p.m. Captain Larson stated that as they were 
leaving the fire station located at approximately 2400 South between 
State and Main (approximately three blocks away) , he and his crews 
could see flames showing above the residence indicating a fully 
involved fire. In addition to this, smoke had already reached the 
freeway to the north indicating that the fire was heavily involved 
and a small wind carried smoke from the south to the north. He 
evidenced, upon arrival, fire coming from the northeast bedroom and 
also from the utility room window also on the north side center 
portion center of the house. 
Their initial attack was gained through the "yellow room" door which 
put them directly in line with the utility room for a rapid attack. 
Captain Larson stated that the fire was extremely hard to extinguish 
and gave the appearance of an accelerated flammable liquid fire. The 
fire had already broken through the roof line in the center portion 
of the home directly above the utility room and had heavily involved 
the adjacent front room and upper levels toward the east of the attic 
and the rooms within it. 
Captain Larson stated that once the fire was extinguished, an 
overhaul revealed that very little, if any fire had occurred within 
the children's bedroom on the west side of the main level and that 
only minimal damage had occurred to the other living room, dining 
room, and upstairs bedroom occupying Mr. and Mrs. Horrell's bedding 
and clothing. Captain Larson stated that in addition to the three 
engines from South Salt Lake, a back-up and support engines from Salt 
Lake County and one from Salt Lake City assisted fire suppression. 
Fire crews remained at the scene until approximately 2:43 a.m. the 
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next morning in an effort to clean up and make sure all hot spots 
were extinguished. 
The subsequent fire at 5:36 a.m. was listed as a rekindle by South 
Salt Lake Fire Department personnel. The same areas were involved, 
and upon arriving, an advanced and highly accelerated fire was in 
progress. Captain Larson indicated he felt that the fire of this 
magnitude was unusual for any type of rekindle. In spite of the 
flammability of the liquid found within the solar panel, Captain 
Larson felt that this fire was suspicious and very possibly assisted 
with other accelerants in the initial ignition of this fire. 
Other law enforcement individuals have talked to this office about 
the fire incident. However, due to the fact that the investigation is 
on-going and that the fire has been listed as a suspicious fire, no 
information will be provided by law enforcement personnel until the 
conclusion of their investigation. Possibly, at this time, results 
of lab tests on the electrical components and debris samples taken by 
the jurisdiction may be provided. At this time, this office has no 
knowledge of any of those results. 
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
With the information, details, and evidence gathered at this point of 
the investigation, a preliminary cause and origin and been 
determined. It is clear with the information obtained during this 
investigation that this fire is definitely an incendiary/arson fire 
due to the suspicious circumstances surrounding the fire incident. 
There is little doubt that this fire and its origin of the initial 
fire occurred within the utility room and simultaneously in the 
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second level northeast attic bedroom. Due to the second fire, which 
appears also to be incendiary, several of the burn patterns from the 
initial fire have been changed and even obliterated due to increased 
burning and the accelerated condition of the second fire. 
The possibility of a rekindle on the second fire incident cannot be 
ruled out. However, the first fire clearly is an intentionally set 
fire. 
To identify the specific individual involved with the initial fire, 
many factors and much information must be defined to eliminate the 
insured and his possible involvement with this incident. One of the 
most confusing details in this scenario is, of course, the alleged 
shooting involved with it and its intentions. As the only eye 
witness to this incident is the insured, himself, one must analyze 
the details provided during this investigation by him to construct a 
relevant story. 
It is of concern that the complexion of this incident, when taken at 
face value, suggests that the insured was attacked by some unknown 
individual who not only attempted to burn his house, but also 
attempted to murder him. From the information provided by the 
insured, this is the bottom line definition of the bizarre set of 
circumstances involved in this fire incident. Of extreme concern when 
trying to analyze and understand this incident, is the acute lack of 
any individual, known or unknown, by the insured or any of his 
friends or relatives, that may have intentions to do him in. There 
is no evidence found anywhere in this incident that would suggest 
strongly or even remotely anyone who would want to do this to him. 
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Upon his own admission, there is no history nor current problems with 
anyone that would make these attacks. 
Also of significant concern is the lack of any motive for anyone to 
do this. It would suggest that possibly a burglar or vandal entered 
the home for those specific reasons. However, no evidence has been 
identified to indicate this. On the other hand, when trying to 
analyze motive for the fire incident, a strong reflection upon the 
insured is suggested through the cursory information already obtained 
during this investigation. It does appear through this evidence that 
the insured is having a heavy financial problem and it also appears 
that.the family income is insufficient to meet the everyday expenses. 
In addition to this, the previously mentioned foreclosure, and also 
it's been learned since the fire incident, that the insured has made 
application for and filed bankruptcy. However, during the interview 
conducted by this office, he now indicates that this has been 
dismissed through the bankruptcy court of Utah. 
A laboratory analysis of the fire scene debris was conducted with the 
following results. Through the use of Rocky Mountain Instrumental 
Laboratories located at 456 South Link Lane, Ft. Collins, Colorado 
80524; telephone number (303) 221-3116, indicated through the 
laboratory report included in this report that the carpet sample and 
control samples taken contained small concentrations of petroleum 
distolate and moderate concentrations of benzene, tolulene, and 
xylene and/or styrene. The debris samples taken of the areas of 
origin contained moderate to large concentrations of the same or very 
similar mixtures of aromatics and low to high molecular weight 
petroleum distolates. 
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A synopsis of this lab result would indicate that the possibility of 
a kerosene product was involved in the fire scene as well as the 
components of the solar system. To isolate the specific chemicals 
and determine other flammables in that debris, other tests would have 
to be conducted. However, without any doubt, there was a large 
concentration of flammable accelerants within the fire scene and 
within the debris and rubble. 
Complications are drawn in evaluating these lab results because of 
the fact that the large amounts of the flammable liquid within the 
solar system confuse or even cover and possibly dilute the types of 
flammable liquids used in the initial ignition of this fire. In 
fact, the exact accelerant used to cause this fire may never be 
determined because of this fact, and also due to the possibility of 
all of the components in that accelerant being consumed during 
combustion phase of both fires. Therefore, the validity and 
importance of these tests are left in question at this point of the 
investigation. 
This office would suggest that, to better identify or eliminate 
individuals indicated in this fire incident, further investigation 
must be done. At this point of the investigation, the insured cannot 
be eliminated as having been involved with this fire situation. This 
office would also recommend that a verification of property ownership 
and past or present encumbrances be identified. It would also be of 
interest to determine whether, in fact, the mortgages and liens have 
been cleared as indicated by Mr. Horrell. A background investigation 
into the utility payment history would also identify specific 
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financial problems with payment of these utility bills. Further 
research into the known and suspected checking accounts would also 
provide additional financial history. 
As indicated by individuals and witnesses interviewed, there could be 
a possible problem and legal battle with UPS concerning vendors 
involved with Mr. Horrell's business. These facts should also be 
investigated to determine their validity. Additionally, an interview 
with Mrs. Horrell concerning the fire incident and details prior to 
it may give additional information about why she wasn't home on the 
night of the fire. The several vehicles identified in this 
investigation and their specific owners and previous owners may also 
be beneficial. 
Of course, a comparison analysis of the statements made by the 
insured and transcribed and included with this report would identify 
inconsistencies and confused statements in both of those 
transcriptions. Generally speaking, the general analysis of those 
statements would give the appearance of deception by the insured to 
specific questions regarding the fire incident. This is also true 
about statements made by the insured concerning his financial 
position. As the insured has indicated that he will cooperate in 
obtaining any information necessary to assist with the investigation, 
it may behoove this office to instruct, by letter form, the insured 
to obtain all of the utility records, financial records, and other 
financial materials of concern prior to and up until the day of the 
fire. 
Due to these inconsistencies and also due to the bizarre 
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circumstances involved with this incident, a clearly defined cause of 
this fire incident with respect to who is involved has not been 
determined. Further investigation and the answering of several 
questions must be conducted before that can be finalized. The 
necessity of and the final determination of the supplemental 
assignments will be left up to the decision of the client. 
Due to the complexity of this case, it may also be in the best 
interest of the client to obtain legal counsel in providing 
assistance with the course of direction of the investigation. This 
office will assist wherever requested in any follow-up or 
supplemental work necessary during this investigation. All evidence 
obtained during the preliminary investigation will be held for future 
needs as necessary and for as long as requested by the client. 
This case assignment is complete with the filing of this preliminary 
report pending further requests of the client. 
Sincerely, 
BURN PATTERN ANALYSIS 
RJ,J/mh r 
Enclosures: Copy of Consent Form for Fire Scene Examination and 
Authorization Form from insured 
Fire reports from South Salt Lake Fire Department 
Laboratory report from Rocky Mountain Instrumental 
Laboratories 
Copies of newspaper articles from Salt Lake Tribune 
61 mounted, 54 loose photographs 
TabB 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSIRUMFNTAL LABORATORIES, INC • 456S. Link Lane. Fort Collins, Colorado80524 • 3C3-22M1I6 
- IENT: 
JBJECT: 
vJALYSIS: 
ETHOD: 
^IDENCE: 
LABORATORY REPORT 
R o b e r t J a c o b s e n 
Burn P a t t e r n A n a l y s i s , I n c . 
S u i t e 2 0 3 
3 1 9 1 S . V a l l e y S t . 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , UT 8 4 1 0 9 S 0 1 - 4 S 7 - 3 5 0 1 
Utah Farm B u r e a u 9 0 - 1 1 7 0 - S L RML 9 0 - 1 4 4 2 - F H o r r a l l 
GC i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f v o l a t i l e f l a m m a b l e s . 
H e w l e t t - P a c k a r d 5 S 9 0 g a s c h r o m a t o g r a p h y H-P 3 3 3 3 computer 
i n t e g r a t o r , J?;<W DB-5+ q u a r t z c a p i l l a r y co lumn 30m x 0.53mm 
I D # 9 3 4 5 4 , 3mL/min He, S 0 - 2 4 0 C £ 1 0 C /min , 1 IH, 5FH, 200uL KS. 
R e c e i v e d from J a c o b s e n 3 NOV** 9 0 v i a USPS, s e a l s i n t a c t , f o u r 
s a m p l e s f i r e d e b r i s and o n e c o n t r o l s a m p l e : 
U l : Can f i r e d e b r i s , # 1 -
U2: Can f i r e d e b r i s ID a s c a r p e t and p a d , d o o r w a y , # 2 . 
U3: G l a s s s a m p l e s from w i n d o w , 
U4: C a r p e t c o n t r o l . NW c o r n e r c h i l d BRf # 4 . 
U3 : P l a s t i c c a n ID a s c o n t r o l s a m p l e of l i q u i d , # 5 . 
ESULTS: 
INCLUSIONS: 
U3 i s n e g a t i / e fo r / o l a t i l e - " l a m m a b i e s . U4 ' c a r p e t c o n t r o l . ' 
c o n t a i n s s m a l l L u n c e n t r a t i o n s of p e t r o l e u m d i s t i l l a t e and 
m o d e r a t e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of b e n z e n e - t o l u e n e and x y l e n e a n d / o r 
s t y r e n e . U i , U2. and US c o n t a i n m o d e r a t e t o l a r g e 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of t h e s ame or v^ry s i m i l a r m i x t u r e s of 
a r o m a t i c s and low t o h i g h m o l e c u l a r w e i g h t p e t r o l e u m 
d i s t i l l a t e . I n c l u d e d i n t h e s e s a m p l e s 3.re b e n z e n e , t o l u e n e , 
, y l e n e s a n d o r s t y r e n e , C9 and C10 a r o m a t i c s , and a i k a n e s CS 
t h r o u g h a p p r o x i m a t e l y C 2 0 . GC/MS would a l l o w t h e 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of p — x y l e n e , s t y r e n e and n o n a n e * 
U l , U2 r a n d U5 c o n t a i n t h r e - s a m e or very s i m i l a r m i x t u i r e ^ o T 
v o l a t i l e f l a m m a b l e materrxaJLs- GC/MS may a l l o w t h e - d s 
;he s a m p l e s -
'J WENDANVS 
EXHIBIT 
psr.±c±R I . . S u l i k , Ph . H . 
1 n A r\ 1 *) *i 
TabC 
WITNESS STATEMENTS TAKEN BY ROBERT JACOBSEN 
AND DEPOSITIONS 
ROO AI1AKSOK 
11/2/90 
VACATION TRIP 
POWER PROBLEMS 
known of over 2 vears 
P5:48-52 
hear about prowler P4.-43 
KITE LEAVING 
>er saw wife PS:26-27 
said wife up at mother's 
P8:26-27 
INTERCOM - MONITOR 
D 8:00 when rlav started 
P4:35-3' 
?d P:00 - 9:2 5 P5:23-24 
TRIPS "TO HOUSE 
Four times p*:6-7 
1 to go to home when games 
olaved P5.3:-43 
ry 1/2 hr. to 3/4 hr. 
P5:57-60; H:Z-S 
it time 8:00 °4;28-31 
/ 5-30 min. pc:25-26,32 
DAVE WIGGINS 
11/2/W 
VACATION TRIP 
Satu*-ca\ before fire, Greg said he 
was taking famiiv to mountains, 
would be bacl Wed about 5:00 p.m. 
and aame w?s still on 
P21:8-12 OeD 
POWER PROBLEMS 
Out on arrival at 5:00 P6:38-41 
If you had prowler why oidn't you 
call Police at 5:00? P18:5^-57 
WIFE LEAVING 
Never sa* wife P6:29-30 
Horrell said wife UD at mother's 
P4:18-19 
INTERCOM - MONITOR 
G-eg said he was listening for 
D-OMers D<:7,17,45" 
Stored 9:00 - 9:15 P5:26-27 
TRIPS TO HOUSE 
Back anc forih all nioht P4:25 
Not usual to oo tc borne wnen qames 
nlaved D5:45 
Eve-\ i/2 h*-. tc 3/4 hr. P6:7 
Horrell acting nervous P5:46 
Dozec off 9:10-10:00 P6:7-13 
Woke UD. Ho-rell out bad P6:7-13 
JACQUFS D'fMAl 
U/01/90 
VACATION TRIP j 
POWER PROBLEMS j 
Doesn't recall power problems 
P60 Dep. 1 
Never mentioned electrical prob-
lems P6:18-21 
WIFE LEAVING 
INTERCOM - MONITOR 
TRIPS TO HOUSE 
Greg oone for 1C minutes to oet 
something to eat at 10:00 P4:43-54 
Went to house 6 times P26 Dep 
Varying amounts of time (1-10 
" m m . ) P58 Dep 
Acting nervous Pl6:27-27 
Something bothering Greg P74 Dep 
Can't remember wny they stopDed 
olaying nignt or fire PI3 Dep 
GRrG HORRTLL 
1/22/91 1 
VACATION TRIP 1 
Trip to Dinosaurland for couple of 
days Pl8:lQ-32 
POWER PROBLEMS 
Family there, no power 5:00 - 7:00 
P20-.5-59 - P21:22 
WIFE LEAVING 
Wife brouaht dinner to him 7:45 
P22-39-45; 23:11-31 
Family went to mother's house, 
took Volvo 8:00 P23:19-39 
INTERCOM - UONnOR 
TRIPS TO HOUSE 
Went to house ior snack at 9:30 
P22:51-53 
Never left store 9:30 - 11:00 
P23:55-56; P26:13-16 
EXAMINATION UNDER OATH 12/30/91 1 
AND DEPOSITION 
GRFG ItORRClL 
VACATION TRIP 
Arranged to close store: Wed., | 
Thurs. and Fri. to go on trip to 
Dinosaurland; left note on store 
that he would be closed P99 Dep 
POWER PROBLEMS 
No problems with electrical 
P81 EU0 
Thunder siurrrs: fairlv stormy 
P66-67 EU0 
WIFE LEAVING 
Wife came to store to say she was 
leavina P54 EU0 
Wife left at 8:00; he suggested to 
her she miaht want to oo up there 
P50 EU0 
INTERCOM - MONITOR 
Set up; Ba*-bar£ yelling; turned 
! down &78 EU0; P 1 2 2 Dec 
TRIPS TO HOUSE 
One trip to house at 9:30 P77 EU0 
EXAMINATION UNDER DATJf 12/3 
AND DEPOSITION 
BARBARA IIORRFl I 
VACATION TRIP 
POWER PROBLEMS 
Doesn't recall any power pro 
t>57 Dep 
WIFE LEAVING 
Went to store to tell Greg 
was leaving P59 Dep 
Power off mostly reason for 
ing overniaht with mothe 
P59 Deo 
INTERCOM - MONITOR 
Sensitive: could hea- peoole 
m q abound P67 DeD 
| TRIPS TO HOUSE 
jt DEFENDAN1 
| EXHIBIT 
1 ANUDCPOSIUONS 
DAVE WIGGINS 
11/7/90 
WAtKAiunn 
—i 
JACfJUFS DTJtAL 
li/i/go 
TIME oar PACK - sttoQim 
No ii lra how long G» eg was out 
bark b r f m e he ramp running 
through U m o P71 Dep 
Hi eg not in room when he 
l e f t , Greg had gone out back 
P78 Oep 
Hoard 7 shots; l l o r r e l l sa id 
someone shooting af h im; 
J Jacques ran across s t r e e t , 
h id for a couple of minutes; 
I not lend smoke, embers f l y i n g 
PG:3l-P7:5 
l as t timn he saw Greg and 
hear ing shots was 2-3 to 5 
minutes P78-81 Oep 
At the very least 2-3 minutes 
P81 Dep 
I f was 5 seconds from shots 
to Greg saying "Someone is 
II shoot ing at mc" P84 Oep 
SEEING 1IIC TIRE 
Saw f i r e w i l h i n 7 minutes of 
running across s t r e e t P15-45 
Oep 
CALLING WtfE 
! Saw l l o r r e l l af scenp, asked 
i f he 'd ca l l ed h is w i f e ye t 
I P0:3-6 
GREG ASKING fOR RIDE 
Greg asked for r i f l e e a r l y 
that n i g h t , probably he fo ie 
the game s ta r t ed 
P32:0-I5 Oep 
f i r s t time he had asked for 
r i de P35 Dep 
our, MORRILI. 
1/72/91 
WALKAR0U1 
1 ( h n k o d van, walked down f la i i i 
S t r e e t , up s ide s t r e e t and a l -
ley - - does every n i gh t to 
lock up P 2 G : l / - 2 l 
TIKE OUr BALK - SlfOOHNG 
Stepped ouf ba< k ; shots 
f i i e d ; ran out l l uow jh b u s i -
ness; d i d n ' t see any f i r e ; 
repor ted shoot ing 
P27.-27-31 
f i r e not a c c i d e n t a l ; set by 
shooter P<15:6-13. 54-57; 
P70: i2-17 
Gun was h i s P3l:r>S-G0 
f u l l y loaded - 1 rounds In I t 
P32:56-G0; 33 : I - 4 
No enemies, no one upset w i t h 
him P31:3-20 
SEEING HIE TIRE 
D i d n ' t know house on f i r e 
when he ran to ne iqhbo is ' 
house PG7-G8, 132 EUO 
CALLING HlfE 
17:00 noon got hold of w i f e , 
t o l d h r r about IV and heat 
being on P18:19, GO; 19:1-3 
GREG ASKING rOR RIOE 
LOCKS 
Wife locks house when she 
leaves P31:55-58 
Said he locked doors in f i r s t 
In te rv iew (Oct . 9, 1990) 
Now not sure i f he d i d 
P34:18-5<1; 35:8-12 
Not aware of any forced e n t r y 
P35:11-18 
Window in laundry room open; 
screen on window; not cut or 
any th ing l i k e that P31:27-39 
Greg, Barbara, mother - in - law 
on l y people w i t h keys 
P35:38-41 | 
I Ami DEPo'sniwis II 
GHrG IIORRELL 
WALKABOUT 
Adamson had l e f t and Wiggins 
was j u s t leav ing when he got 
back from walkabout P55 EUO 
/ 
/ flHE OUf flACK ~ SIKWriNG 
v - 1 to 5 minutes to walk down 
Main to Russett and up Russett 
to a l l e y and back P127 Oep 
No reason to be l feve f i r e was 
e l e c t r i c a l P81 Dep 
Bel ieves he i n t e r r u p t e d 
a robbery PI49 Oep 
Saw 7 b r i gh t f lashes o f l l q l i t ; 
c i r c u l a r In na tu re ; redd ish 
wh i le P129-130, 138 Dep 
No enemies or people w i t h 
grudges aga ins t him P20 EUO 
SEEING THE TIRE 
CALLING wire 
l t : 0 0 - 11:30 a.m. c a l l e d 
w i f e ; t o l d her about IV and 
heat being on; noth ing d i s -
turbed P99-I00 Oep 
Greg d i d n ' t c a l l w i f e to r e -
por t f i r e P167 Oep 
GREG ASKING TOR RIDE 
Greg asked fo r r i d e a t 10:45 
p.m. at end of game P55 EUO 
LOCKS 
Wife normal ly locks doors 
P125-12G Dep 
D i f f e r e n t key fo r each door 
P79 
Locked f r o n t door a t 9:30 
P54-79 EUO 
Latch on windows - - d ryer 
vented through laundry room 
window P40-41 EUO 
Greg, Barbara, mother - in - law 
had keys PI 17 Dep 
BARBARA IIORRELL 
WALKAHOUr 
TIME OUf BACK - SlfOOflNG 
Shooting and f i r e seemed con-
nected to both her and Greg 
PG5-GG Oep 
"Whoever shot a t Greg must 
have had something to do w i th 
f i r e " P66 Oep 
Greg in te r rup ted a t h i e f 
P74 Oep 
SEEING THE HRE 
11 
CALLING.Hilt 
GREG A5KING TOR RIDE 
LOCKS 
Habit of lock ing doors when 
she leaves P84 Dep 
Made sure th ings were locked 
when she l e f t P04 Dep 
Doors and windows were locked 
before f i r e P35 EUO 
TabD 
EXHIBIT 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEES SALE 
% 
.ilEKESM. 
THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED PROPERTY WILL BE SOLD AT PUBLIC 
AUCTION TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER, PAYABLE IN LAWFUL MONEY OF THE 
UNITED STATES AT THE TIME OF SALE, AT THE NORTH FRONT DOOR OF THE SALT 
LAKE COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, S.L.C., UTAH 
ON 29 OCT 1990, AT 10:00 O'CLOCK A.M. OF SAID DAY FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF FORECLOSING THAT CERTAIN TRUST DEED DATED 
11 JUL 1983, AND RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY 
RECORDER OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, AND BEING 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
TRUSTOR: GREGORY S. HORRELL AND BARBARA J. 
HORRELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE 
TRUSTEE: ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
BENEFICIARY: *** 
RECORDED: 13 JUL 19S3 
ENTRY NO.: 3818010 
BOOK: 5474 
PAGE: 2083 
AND COVERING REAL PROPERTY MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
ALL OF LOT 148 SOUTHGATE PARK, A SUBDIVISION 
OF LOTS 8 AND 10, AND THE SOUTH ONE-HALF 
OF LOT 9, BLOCK 33 TEN ACRE PLAT "A", 
BIG FIELD SURVEY. 
LESS THE 7 FEET CONVEYED TO SALT LAKE 
COUNTY AS EVIDENCED BY THE RIGHT OF WAY 
DEED DATED MARCH 29, 1940, AND RECORDED 
APRIL 2, 1940 AS ENT. NO. 87445, IN BOOK 
249, AT PAGE 214, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
DATED THIS 2ND DAY OF OCTOBER, 1990. 
ASSOCIATED TITLE-COMPANY, 
A UTAH CORPORATION 
TRUSTEE 
BLAKEZT. HEIHER1 
ITS: VICEZPRESinENT 
FC-12B.6". 
**ARLENE_E. BECKSTRCM, AS PEHSONAL-REERESENTATIYEIOF MARIEIK^ OLSEN, 
S TO AN-UNDIVIDED--1/2 INTEREST," ANDZARLEENZE. BECKSTRCM, N. ftf-f.KN -HKITBRRG, 
S-TRDSTEE FOR GARY LEE MCDONALD, AS TO "AN UNDIVIDED J./2 -.INTEREST. 
1000028 
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PROOF OF MAILING 
2770 S KUX 81 
SALT LAU a n UT 84115 
3133692 HO Policy Number and Description 
October 4, 1990 Cancellation Date of Insurance 
Effective 12:01 A.M., Standard Time 
August 31, 1990 ^ a t e Notice Mailed 
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION - UTAH 
In accordance with the law and the terms of the above numbered policy, we are sending this 
notice to inform you that your policy is being cancelled. 
Your policy will not provide coverage beyond the cancellation date and time shown above. 
Premium Adjustment: 
If a refund of premium for the unexpired term of this policy is due you, it is enclosed or will be 
sent to you. 
Reason (s) for Cancellation: 
Ineligible due to unacceptable credit report 
PS to agents Ve suggest you cobtact 7BL Brokerage for possible coverage. 
Information for Insured: 
1. If the reason shown above does not state with reasonable precision the facts on which our 
decision was based, you may request in writing clarifying information. We must respond within 
10 working days of receipt of your request. 
2. You have the right to request claim loss information regarding this policy. We will provide 
you with this information within 30 days of receipt of your request. 
3. H If indicated, this action is based on information provided to us in a report made at our 
request. Questions regarding this information should be sent to: 
Trim Unlnn Credit Bspnrt, Knx 3110, Fullerton Ca 92ilk 
Thank you for allowing us to serve your insurance needs. We regret we cannot continue this 
insurance coverage. 
loaald Kuehler 
Attte/rersoaal Lias* Uudervriter 
BXtJa 
TabF 
March 18, 1992 
CERTIFIED LETTER 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
Mr. Greg & Barbara Horrell 
%Keith W. Meade 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 E. First S., 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Our Insured 
Our Policy # 
D/L 
Greg & Barbara Horrell 
5193692 
10/3/90 
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Horrell: 
We have carefully reviewed the pertinent facts and circumstances of your claim and find 
that we must decline payment to you for one or more of the following reasons: 
1. The fire appears to be of incendiary origin, for which an insured is responsible, 
and, therefore, you are guilty of fraud and false swearing within the meaning of 
the terms of your policy of insurance. 
2. You have breached the conditions of your policy by misrepresenting an insured's 
involvement in the burning or the procuring the burning of the dwelling in 
question. 
3. The Proof of Loss is fraudulent in that you deny any knowledge of the origin of 
the fire. 
4. The Proof of Loss is fraudulent as to the items destroyed in the fire, the value of 
the items destroyed, and the place of purchase of some of the items destroyed. 
5. You have breached the policy conditions by not completing the Proof of Loss 
within a reasonable length of time. Your failure to do so has prejudiced the rights 
of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. 
6. You have breached the policy conditions by not producing documents requested 
at the Examination Under Oath. Namely, the income tax returns for 3 years. 
Your policy provides: CONCEALMENT OR FRAUD 
This entire policy shall be void, whether before or after the loss, any insured has 
intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstances related to 
this insurance. 
0000200 
Policy #5193692 
Page 2 
We hereby expressly reserve the right to assert all other defenses that we may have to 
your claim, even though not enumerated above, as they become known to this 
company or as counsel may advise. 
If you intend to precede with litigation, strict compliance with the provision of the policy 
will be required including the requirement to commence any action within 3 years after 
the date of the fire. By this letter, we do not intend to waive or relinquish any of the 
rights or defenses under the terms of this policy. 
Sincerely, 
Larry L Bachmann 
Property Lines Claim Manager 
jr 
0000201 
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Third t»i<i«oia»ui5iH^ 
JUN 2 4 1994 
By frrW'^^^putyC l e r k 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
GREGORY S. HORRELL and 
BARBARA HORRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and FARM BUREAU MUTUAL 
INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CASE NO. 920903327 
After consideration of the Court's instructions, you the 
jurors are requested to answer the following questions. Six or 
more of you must agree on the answer to each question. 
1. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Gregory 
Horrell intentionally set the fire which occurred at his residence 
on October 3, 1990? 
ANSWER: Yes No X. 
2. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that either 
Gregory or Barbara Horrell intentionally misrepresented to Farm 
Bureau material facts concerning their claim as defined in the jury 
instructions? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
-2-
If you have answered questions 1 or 2 "yes," then you 
should sign and return this Special Verdict. 
3. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
second fire was a rekindling of the first fire? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm 
Bureau failed to diligently investigate the facts surrounding 
Horrells' claim to determine whether the claim was valid? 
ANSWER: Yes >C No 
5. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm 
Bureau breached any of its other contractual duties of good faith 
and fair dealing owed to Horrells, including the duties to: fairly 
evaluate the claim; act promptly and reasonably in either rejecting 
or settling the claim; deal with the Horrells as laymen and not as 
experts in the subtleties of law and insurance; refrain from 
injuring the Horrells7 ability to obtain the benefits of the 
insurance policy? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
6. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as that term has been 
defined in the instructions? 
ANSWER: Yes No \ 
-3-
7. If your response to Question 3 is "no," you may award 
only damages resulting from the first fire. If your response to 
question 3 is "yes," then you may award the Horrells damages 
suffered as a result of both fires. Based upon this possible 
limitation, what by a preponderance of the evidence are the damages 
suffered by the Horrells as a result of the fires and/or as a 
result of Farm Bureau's conduct for: 
Damage to the Horrells' residence 
(not to exceed $46,500.00) 
Damage to the Horrells' personal property 
(not to exceed $77,000.00) 
Damage for Horrells' loss of use of the 
property (not to exceed $5,950.00) 
Demolition 
Other general and consequential damages, 
as described in the jury instructions, 
but not including attorney's fees 
TOTAL 
Dated this _day of June, 19 
HfiOtCQ $jtj. 
sM.OOO.oc 
sWSG'OO 
$z,ffl?-CC 
SlUOOrM. 
tW.000*00 
lat.. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If the insurer has reasonable justification to deny the claim, 
its refusal to negotiate or settle may not constitute a breach of 
its duty. 
An insurer may be reasonably justified in denying a claim if 
the supporting law or facts are "fairly debatable" and would lead 
a reasonable insurance company in similar circumstances to deny the 
claim. "Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which 
support the insurer's position create a reasonable likelihood that 
the denial of the claim would be upheld in court. In determining 
whether or not the insurer's position was fairly debatable and 
reasonably justified, you should consider all laws or facts upon 
which a reasonable insurance company would rely in deciding whether 
to pay a claim. This would include the laws or facts supporting 
the insured's position that were either known, or that should have 
been known, by the insurer. 
Tab I 
QGT i : —'• 
1 THE COURT: The Court is persuaded that 
2 there is substantial evidence that the claims were 
3 fairly debatable. I make no finding thereon, but 
4 simply make the observation. 
5 I am convinced and persuaded that the 
6 Court ought not to surrender to overzealous 
7 advocacy. And it is a more orderly way to proceed in 
8 following the law of the case that that was 
9 established by the Court's order April the 19th, 
10 1994, in which I had concluded in written form that 
11 the issues on the defenses would be submitted to the 
12 jury on a preponderance of the evidence. Wherein in 
13 the heat of battle that was or didn't come to my 
14 attention or didn't at least get from counsel to the 
15 Court's mind clearly is beyond me. But as bad as I 
16 hate to do it, the Court's going to grant a new 
17 trial. I think that makes the other rulings moot. 
18 MR. MEADE: Your Honor, we did discuss 
19 that at the time, and -- I mean, there is no -- there 
20 is no case law that supports this one way or the 
21 other in this state. And I realize that you've 
221 spoken, but the fact of the matter is that a new 
23 trial in this case is going to take a lot of time and 
24 cost a lot of money. And we could try this case on 
25 this different standard and we could go up and you 
1 could be wrong and we will be back. The worst case 
2 after an appeal is that we try the case twice. Now, 
3 you are subjecting the parties to the chance that 
4 they may have to try this case three times. And, I 
5 submit that the -- that there's no logic involved in 
6 that given the fact that there's no controlling case 
7 law. You are just taking a shot at it as to what the 
8 burden might be. And we ought to find out from some 
9 appellate court what the burden is going to be. And 
10 why spend another $50,000 to get there? 
11 THE COURT: I agree with the practical 
12 effects. 
13 New trial is granted. 
14 (Hearing adjourned.) 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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